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Abstract
We develop a two-period model with endogenous investment and credit flows. Credit is
subject to quantitative restrictions. With an exogenous restriction, we analyze the welfare
effects of temporary tariffs. We then consider three scenarios under which a monopoly lender
optimally decides the level of credit and a borrower country chooses an import tariff: one in
which the two parties act simultaneously and two scenarios where one of them has a first-
mover advantage. The equilibrium under the leadership of the borrower country is Pareto
superior to the Nash equilibrium but may or may not be to that under the leadership of
the lender. If the sequence of moves is itself chosen strategically, leadership by the borrower
emerges as the unique equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The inter-relationship between goods and financial markets is well recognized in economics
(see, for example, Mankiw [2002]). This relates as much to international markets as to
domestic ones. Problems or distortions in one of the markets is likely to spill over to the
other one, compounding the problem. For example, developing countries who are normally
borrowers on international capital markets, are most likely to face restrictions and other
types of distortions which affect their ability to borrow. These problems in the capital
market would distort the allocation of resources in the production of goods and services.
The generalized theory of distortions and welfare tells us that, even in the presence of
spill over, the second- or first-best option is to intervene directly in the market which is the
source of the distortion (See Bhagwati and Ramaswamy, 1963; Bhagwati, 1971). That is, in
our case a tax on borrowing would be the appropriate policy intervention. However, when
such an intervention is not possible, we shall show that an intervention in the international
goods market can alleviate the distortion to some extent.1
Thus, the first part of the paper examines the effects of temporary trade intervention
— in the form of either a import tariff or export subsidy — when borrowing from overseas
is subject to quantitative restrictions imposed from abroad.2
We start by analyzing a two-period economy with endogenous investment, which is
small in goods markets and has undistorted market structure in both exporting and importing
industries, but is subject to exogenous borrowing restrictions from foreign lenders. In this
framework, we show that a trade intervention in the first period, either in the form of an
import tariff or an export subsidy, is optimal given the credit constraint.3
1It is indeed true that a tax on overseas borrowing is very rarely used. As we shall point out later on (see
footnotes 12 and 13), the main results of the paper will hold if we consider borrowing tax as an instrument
rather than temporary tariff. We present the case of temporary tariff simply for the reason that it is a more
commonly recognized instrument than borrowing tax.
2For an analysis of temporary tariffs in a different context see Djajic´ [1987].
3This result bears some similarity with those in the literature on optimal tariffs, which has established
that a large economy can improve its static terms of trade and increase its welfare by an appropriately
1
After showing the benefits of temporary trade intervention by a borrower country,
we go on to examine how such a policy might interact with endogenous credit constraints
imposed from the side of a lender.4 In order to do so, we assume that a private bank in
the lending country with monopoly power in overseas lending sets the amount lent to the
borrowing country. This scenario would reflect the dominance of large multinational banks
in channeling loans to developing countries, particularly through the use of loan syndicates
which take in funds from many banks of various sizes but are effectively controlled and
administered by one large ‘lead’ bank.5 While the government of the borrower country
optimally decides the level of a temporary import tariff maximizing the welfare of its rep-
resentative citizen, the monopoly lender decides on the amount of loan by maximizing its
profits. We examine three variants of this overall game. In the first game, both parties act
simultaneously to set their respective instruments; in the second one, the borrowing country
has a first-mover advantage and in the last game, the monopoly lender does.
In the context of the simultaneous-move game, we show that the Nash equilibrium
involves both a binding restriction on the supply of loans and a positive level of the tariff.
We also show that a piece-meal reform which raises the supply of credit and lowers the
tariff is strictly Pareto-improving relative to the Nash equilibrium. This highlights the result
that whilst trade intervention and capital controls might be mutual best-responses in a
non-cooperative sense, global welfare could be increased by a combined relaxation of both
chosen tariff (see, for example, Johnson [1968]). In our framework, trade intervention has no effects on the
country’s static terms of trade, and the channel of welfare improvement works through interest rates (the
inter-temporal terms of trade); in particular, through changes in the domestic interest rates.
4Endogenous credit constraints can also arise under scenarios involving adverse selection and costly mon-
itoring by competitive lenders (Stiglitz and Weiss [1983], Williamson [1987]). In such scenarios the results
about the welfare-improving nature of tariff intervention would still hold. Since the amount lent is not strate-
gically chosen so our analysis of a strategically chosen constraint will not be applicable. However, one can,
in principle, consider adverse selection and costly monitoring even when the lender is a monopolist. Such
an extension will complicate our analysis enormously and move us away from our focus on the monopoly
distortion in lending and strategic interactions between a monopoly lender and a borrower.
5Even if many banks could directly lend to the developing country, there could be circumstances, such as
when the loans are channeled through the recipient country’s government, that monopoly-like outcomes could
obtain in the loan market (see Paasche and Zin [2001]). In any case, we provide an alternative interpretation
of the lender in section 5. There we explicitly analyze equilibrium in the second country, whose competitive
private sector lends to the competitive private sector of the borrower country. The government of the lender
country optimally sets a quota on how much its private sector can lend.
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distortions.
In the sequential game, when the government of the borrowing country moves first,
the equilibrium tariff is indeed set at a lower level, and the flow of credit is indeed higher,
than in the simultaneous-move game. When the monopoly lender moves first, however,
while the tariff remains lower than in the simultaneous-move benchmark, the restriction on
credit also becomes tighter than in the benchmark case. These comparative results suggest
that Stackelberg leadership by the borrower might be the preferred scenario from the Pareto
point of view. In other words, if debtor countries take the initiative and demonstrate a
credible commitment to reducing policy-induced trade distortions, this could be met by a
relaxation of credit constraints by creditor countries – to the benefit of both. We also find
that leadership by the borrower can be Pareto superior even to that by the lender, thus
making the leadership by the borrower an endogenous outcome as it will be desirable for
all parties in such a situation. Furthermore, if the sequence of actions (as opposed to the
actions themselves) is subject to strategic determination as in a game a la Hamilton and
Slutsky [1990], we find that leadership by the borrower will be the unique equilibrium.6
The first result of this paper, viz. that an optimal tariff is positive when an economy
faces exogenous borrowing constraints,7 has also been derived by Edwards and van Wijnber-
gen [1986]. But Edwards and van Wijnbergen established their result under the assumption
that the borrowing constraint falls only on investment and not on consumption. This added
a wedge between the interest rate on investment and that on consumption. In our paper,
the optimality of trade intervention is established without adding a further distortion in the
domestic credit market. The two papers are also very different in other important respects
and seek to analyze very different issues; while Edwards and van Wijnbergen examine the
relative merits of gradualist and cold-turkey approaches to trade policy reforms for given
6For an early treatment of endogenous leadership in a Cournot oligopolistic model with multiple firms,
see Ono [1978].
7Osang and Turnovsky [2000] analyses the effect of differentiated tariffs on growth and welfare under
borrowing constraints.
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levels of the credit constraint, we examine the interaction between trade interventions and
credit constraints, and the role of credible commitments by one of the players in achieving a
Pareto improvement.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline a two-period
model in which the level of borrowing is exogenously given, and discuss the welfare effects
of a temporary trade intervention. In section 3, the level of borrowing is determined by a
monopoly lender in the lender country. In section 3.1, we analyze the case in which the
two players act simultaneously; section 3.2 studies the case in which the borrower country
acts as a leader and section 3.3, the case in which the lender is the leader. The possibility
of endogenous determination of leadership is shown in section 4. Section 5 provides an
alternative interpretation of the leader. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The case of an exogenous borrowing constraint
We consider an open economy lasting two periods, 1 and 2. It produces two goods per period
and is small in world commodity markets, so that the prices of the two goods are exogenous.
Goods labeled 1 and 2 are produced during t = 1 while goods labeled 3 and 4 are produced
during t = 2.
In order to focus the exposition, we shall establish the convention that goods 1 and 3
are exportables while goods 2 and 4 are importables. Pi is the world price of good i. Prices
are normalized such that P1 = 1.
The economy starts at t = 1 with K units of capital. At t = 1, it can add to this
through investment, I, which becomes available at t = 2.8 The economy faces a binding
restriction on how much it can borrow overseas, b¯, which applies to both investment and
consumption. The credit market and all the product and factor markets are assumed to be
8Investment is in terms of the numeraire good 1.
4
perfectly competitive within the domestic country.9
The government employs a temporary specific import tariff denoted by τ1 in period
1. Tax revenues are transferred to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion. The formal analysis
presented below is not affected if we reverse the convention on exportables and importables,
and interpret τ1 as a subsidy on the exports at t = 1.
The economy is described by the following equations:
E
(
1, P2 + τ1,
P3
1 + r
,
P4
1 + r
, u
)
+ I =
+R1(1, P2 + τ1, K) +
R2(P3, P4, K + I)
1 + r
+ τ1
[
E2 −R12
]
(1)
(1 + r)b¯ = R2 − P3E3 − P4E4 (2)
R23 = (1 + r). (3)
Equation (1) represents the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. It states that
the total discounted present value of consumption expenditure is equal to the discounted
present value of income including tariff revenue. Equation (2) describes the borrowing con-
straint: total repayment (capital plus interest) in period 2 is equal to income over expendi-
ture in that period. The investment choice is described by (3), and is obtained by setting
(∂u/∂I) = 0 from (1) for a given level of the domestic interest rate, r. Together the three
equations determine the three endogenous variables: utility level u; interest rate r, and the
level of investment I.
In the above equations, E(·) is the expenditure function, R1 is the revenue function
at t = 1, R2 is revenue at t = 2, R2−E3−P2E4 is the current account surplus at t = 2, and
E2 −R12 is the level of imports of good 2 at t = 1.10
9In section 3, the restriction on borrowing is explicitly modeled as the amount lent by a bank which has
monopoly power in intermediating funds from the foreign country. This source of credit constraints would
be compatible with the domestic credit market itself being perfectly competitive, i.e., private agents in the
borrowing country being price takers.
10The expenditure function represents the minimum level of expenditure that can possibly attain a given
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We assume that all goods are substitutes — both intra- and inter-temporally, and
that all goods are normal. Formally,
Eij > 0, i 6= j = 1, 2, 3, 4, and Ei5 > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Differentiating (1)-(3), we get:
α du = − H
(1 + r)2
dr − βdτ1, (4)
∆ dr = −(1 + r)db¯−
[
P3E32 + P4E42 − βγ
α
]
dτ1 (5)
R233dI = dr, (6)
where
α = E5 − τ1E25 > 0,
β = τ1
[
E22 −R122
]
,
G = τ1(P3E23 + P4E24),
H = (1 + r)b¯+G,
∆ = b¯− P3E33 + 2P4E34 + P4E44
1 + r
− (1 + r)
R233
− γH
α(1 + r)2
> 0,
γ = P3E35 + P4E45 > 0.
α > 0 is known as the Hatta normality condition. It can be shown that if good 1 is normal,
then α is indeed positive. Walrasian stability in the credit market ensures that ∆ > 0.
Equation (4) shows that an increase in r has two negative effects on welfare.First, since
the country is a borrower, it suffers an intertemporal terms-of-trade loss. The second effect
level of utility. A revenue function is the maximum value of total output that can be achieved for given
commodity prices, technology and endowments. The partial derivative of an expenditure (revenue) function
with respect to the price of a good gives the Hicksian demand (supply) for that good. Moreover, the matrix
of second order partial derivatives with respect to the prices of an expenditure (revenue) function is negative
(positive) semi-definite. For this and other properties of expenditure and revenue function see, for example,
Dixit and Norman [1980]. Since the endowments of factors other than capital do not vary in our analysis,
they are omitted from the arguments of the revenue functions. We denote by Ri (Ei) the partial derivative
of the revenue (expenditure) function with respect to the ith argument.
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is via decreases in tariff revenues: an increase in r makes period 2 consumption relatively
cheaper and this reduces period 1 consumption and therefore period 1 imports, resulting in
smaller revenues for a given τ1.
11
An increase in τ1, for a given value of r, increases the domestic price of the importable
in period 1 and therefore reduces imports and tariff revenues. This is welfare reducing.
An increase in b¯ represents an increase in the flow of credit and thus reduces the
interest rate, as can be seen from (5). An increase in τ1 has two opposing effects on the
demand for credit and thus on r. First, it makes period 2 prices relatively cheaper reducing
excess of income over consumption in period 2 and thus the demand for loans. This reduces
the interest rate. An increase in τ1, for reasons mentioned before, also reduces tariff revenues
and thus reduces income in period 1. This increases the demand for loans and thus the
interest rate. These two effects are captured by the coefficients of dτ1 in (5).
12 Equation (6)
simply states that an increase in r reduces investment by reducing the present value of its
returns.
Substituting (5) into (4), we find that
du
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=0
> 0. (7)
From (7) and the concavity of the welfare function, it follows that the optimal value
of τ1 is positive. Note that in the alternative interpretation of the model, with good 2 as an
exportable, τ1 would represent a subsidy, since in the expression for T , τ1[E2 −R12] becomes
negative when τ1 is positive and [E2−R12] is negative. Our analysis would go through intact
11Note that welfare is not directly affected by changes in I, except through its presence in the lump-sum
tax, as I is optimally chosen (the envelope property).
12 If, instead of tariffs, we have a borrowing tax as the instrument, the mechanism via which it would
affect the interest rate would be very similar. A borrowing tax would raise the ex-ante domestic interest rate
above its no-intervention value (which would already exceed the world interest rate because of the borrowing
constraint), lowering the present value of period-2 prices and thus making period-2 prices relatively cheaper.
This would in turn, as with the case of tariffs, increase expenditure in period-2 and reduce the demand for
loans in period 1. This would succeed in lowering the before-tax domestic interest rate faced by domestic
borrowers. A borrowing tax also has a revenue effect as does a tariff. Thus the the effect of a borrowing tax
on the interest rate — which is the key variable in our analysis — is qualitatively similar to that of a tariff.
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except for some differences in interpretation. Hence, the direction of optimal intervention in
trade is to subsidize exports or tax imports.13 Formally,
Proposition 1: For a small open economy subject to a binding borrowing constraint, it is
optimal either to impose a tariff on imports or a subsidy on exports.
The main reason why an optimal import tariff or export subsidy is positive has to
do with the effect that it has on the domestic interest rate, r. Since b¯ is fixed, the level of
borrowing cannot be affected directly by any of the instruments. However, they can affect
one of its consequences, namely the level of the interest rate.
Recall from above that an increase in τ1 induces two conflicting effects on the ex ante
demand for credit at t = 1: a negative substitution effect arising from a lower domestic
demand for consuming good 2 at t = 1 (thus improving the current account at t = 1) and a
positive income effect arising from the fall in tariff revenues. Starting from τ1 = 0, the tariff
revenue effect is negligible, so an increase in τ1 reduces the demand for loans and reduces r.
Note that an alternative scenario under which the borrowing country’s domestic in-
terest rate could become endogenous is when, instead of a borrowing constraint, the country
could borrow as much as it wants but had to pay an endogenous risk premium (above the
risk-free world interest rate) on its loans. So long as the premium was positively related to
the country’s demand for funds, a temporary tariff or export subsidy would have qualita-
tively similar effects as in the case studied here. This is because such a tariff would lower
the country’s demand for funds at any given value of the risk premium and this would make
the premium itself fall.
13 If the instrument used was a borrowing tax, one can show that the optimal policy would be to tax,
rather than subsidize, borrowing. This is because a tax on borrowing will reduce the demand for loan, thus
lowering the equilibrium interest rate and improving the borrowing country’s inter-temporal terms of trade.
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3 The case of an endogenous borrowing constraint
In the preceding section, we assumed that the borrowing constraint, b¯, was determined
exogenously. In this section, we introduce a foreign bank which is the only source of loans
to the borrowing country and which determines the size of b¯ by maximizing its profits, i.e.,
we assume that a private bank with monopoly power in intermediating loans sets b¯. The
bank’s profits, pi, are given by
pi = r(b¯)b¯− r∗b¯, (8)
where r(b¯) is the inverse demand function for loans facing the bank and r∗ is the average
(marginal) opportunity cost to the bank. We shall assume that the bank takes r∗ as given
while maximizing its profits. In fact, we shall take it to be exogenous. However, as we shall
note later on (see footnote 15), r∗ can be endogenous and determined in a competitive loans
market in the foreign country.
For future reference, differentiating (8), we obtain:
dpi = (r − r∗)db¯+ b¯ dr, (9)
where dr is as in (5).
We shall now consider three scenarios and compare equilibria across them. In the
first scenario, we shall assume that the two players play a Nash game, i.e. the home country
maximizes its welfare by optimally choosing τ1 taking the level of b¯ as given, and at the
same time, the foreign bank maximizes its profits pi by optimally choosing b¯ taking τ1 as
given. In the second scenario, we shall assume that the borrower country has a first-mover
advantage. In particular, we consider a two stage game. In order to obtain a sub-game
perfect equilibrium, the game is solved using backward induction. In stage 2 of the game,
the foreign bank decides on an optimal value of b¯ contingent upon a given value for τ1. In
stage 1, the borrower country optimally decides on the level of τ1 by taking into account
the reaction function of the bank from the second stage. In the final scenario, the order of
9
the game is reversed in the sense that the borrower country is a follower and the bank is
the leader. The three scenarios are now considered in turn in each of the following three
subsections.
3.1 The Nash game
In this sub-section, we consider a Nash game in τ1 and b¯ between the home country and
the foreign bank. From (4), (5) and (9), by setting ∂u/∂τ1 = 0 and ∂pi/∂b¯ = 0, we obtain
the following first order conditions, which are solved simultaneously to derive the Nash
equilibrium values, (τN1 , b¯
N):
τ1 : β∆ =
H
(1 + r)2
·
[
P3E23 + P4E24 − βγ
α
]
(10)
b¯ : ² =
r − r∗
1 + r
, (11)
where
² = −d(1 + r)
db¯
· b¯
1 + r
> 0;
and H and ∆ simplify to:
H = τ1(P3E23 + P4E24) + (1 + r)b¯ > 0,
∆ = b¯− P3E33 + 2P4E34 + P4E44
1 + r
− 1 + r
R233
− γH
α(1 + r)2
> 0,
and other variables are as defined before.
It follows from (4) and (5) that
du
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=0
> 0,
and from (11) that at the Nash equilibrium r > r∗. Since at the first best (i.e. when the
global welfare is maximized), τ1 = 0 and b¯ is such that r = r
∗, it is then clear that τN1 is
higher, and b¯N lower, than their respective first-best values.
10
Since ∂u/∂τ1 = ∂pi/∂b¯ = 0 at the Nash equilibrium, from (4), (5) and (9) we get:
α∆ du|τ1=τN1 , b¯=b¯N =
H
1 + r
db¯ (12)
∆ dpi|τ1=τN1 , b¯=b¯N = −
b¯N
1 + r∗
·
[
P3E32 + P4E42 − βγ
α
]
dτ1
= − b¯
N(1 + r∗)β∆
H
dτ1. (13)
That is, starting from the Nash equilibrium, a party’s welfare is affected only by the actions
of the other party. In other words, it is only the international externalities channeled through
changes in the interest rate r that matter. It should be clear from the above two equations
that the nature of the international externalities are such that a multilateral agreement in
which the lender agrees to increase b¯ and the borrower country decides to reduce τ1, will
increase the welfare levels of both.
This result is stated formally in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Starting from the Nash equilibrium, a multilateral piecemeal reform of
policies such that db¯ > 0 and dτ1 < 0 is strictly Pareto improving.
The first best, as shown above, in this framework is given by a situation in which
τ1 = 0 and b¯ is higher than b¯
N . Therefore, the multilateral piecemeal reform proposed in
Proposition 2 takes the the two variables toward their respective first-best levels. This has
to be globally welfare improving. The international externalities at the Nash equilibrium
happens to be such that the reform is in fact strictly Pareto improving.
3.2 The borrower country has a first-mover advantage
In this subsection we consider a two-stage game in which the borrower country acts as the
leader.
11
From the foc for b¯ ((11))we get:14,15
db¯
dτ1
=
∂r
∂τ1
· b¯
1+r
²
.
Substituting (10) into (5), we get:
∂r
∂τ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τN1
= −
[
P3E32 + P4E42 − βγ
α
]
= −(1 + r
∗)2β∆
H
< 0, (15)
therefore from (14) that
db¯
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τN1
< 0. (16)
The above equation states that, at least in the neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium,
the lender’s reaction function is downward sloping. The intuition for this best understood
by thinking in terms of a small tariff reduction: starting from the Nash equilibrium, this
will unambiguously decrease the country’s demand for funds, so the lender’s response will
certainly involve an increase in the amount lent.
Finally, from (12) and (16) we find:
α
du
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τN1
=
H
∆
· db¯
dτ1
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τN1
< 0. (17)
From (17) and the concavity of the welfare function it follows that the optimal value of
τ1 is higher in the Nash game than in the game where the borrower country has a first-move
14In order to avoid third order derivatives, we assume that ² is constant.
15 When r∗ is determined endogenously in a competitive market in the foreign country, equation (14) is
modified to
db¯
dτ1
=
∂r
∂τ1
· b¯1+r
²+ ²∗
, (14)
where
²∗ =
d(1 + r∗)
db¯
· b¯
1 + r∗
> 0.
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advantage. From (5), it can be shown that r is a U-shaped function of τ1. Furthermore,
from (15) it follows that at τ1 = τ
N
1 , r is a decreasing function of τ1. Since the optimal value
of τ1 in this case is lower than τ
N
1 , it is then evident that in the relevant range for τ1, r is
a decreasing function of τ1, and therefore from (14) we can tell that b¯ is also a decreasing
function of τ1 in that range. Thus, the optimal value of b¯ is higher compared to its Nash
equilibrium value.
Proposition 3: Equilibrium τ1 is higher and b¯ lower in the Nash game than in the game
where the borrower country has a first-mover advantage.
By committing itself to a particular value of τ1, the borrower country can influence
the behavior of the lender who is a follower in the present game. By lowering the value of τ1,
it is able to raise the level of loans, and thereby increase its welfare compared to the Nash
equilibrium.
3.3 The lender bank has a first-mover advantage
In this section we consider a two-stage game in which the lender bank acts as the leader.
From (4), we get:
α
du
dτ1
= −β + Hµ
(1 + r)τ1
, (18)
where
µ =
d(1 + r)
dτ1
· τ1
1 + r
.
From (18), the first order condition from the second stage of the game is given by:
τ1 : 0 = −βτ1 + µ(P3E23 + P4E24)τ1
1 + r
+ b¯µ = f(τ1, b¯) (say). (19)
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Differentiating (19), the slope of the reaction function is obtained as:16
∂f
∂τ1
· dτ1
db¯
= −∂f
∂b¯
=
µ(P3E23 + P4E24)τ1
(1 + r)2
· dr
db¯
− µ. (20)
Since dr/db¯ < 0 ((5)) and ∂f/∂τ1 < 0 (the second order condition for optimality),
from (20) we get dτ1/db¯ > 0, and therefore using the Nash property and (13) we obtain:
dpi
db¯
∣∣∣∣
b¯=b¯N
=
∂dpi
db¯
∣∣∣∣
b¯=b¯N
+
dpi
dτ1
· dτ1
db¯
=
dpi
dτ1
· dτ1
db¯
< 0. (21)
From (21) and the concavity of the welfare function it follows that the optimal value
of b¯ is the lower when the lender is the leader than in the Nash game. Furthermore, since
the optimal value of τ1 is an increasing function of b¯, the optimal value of τ1 is also lower
than its Nash equilibrium level. Formally,
Proposition 4: Equilibrium τ1 and b¯ are both higher in the Nash game than in the game
where the lender bank has a first-mover advantage.
Note that, unlike the reaction function of the lender, the reaction function of the
borrower is positively sloped, the import tariff is strategically complementary to the loan
size in the borrower’s reaction function. So if the lender relaxes the borrowing constraint,
the borrowers reacts by setting an even higher tariff than before. The intuition for this is
strikingly simple: the benefit to the borrower of achieving a unit reduction in the interest
rate becomes greater as the amount borrowed becomes larger. In this case, the lender is
able to force the borrower country to lower its tariff level by committing itself to a lower
(rather than higher) level of lending, and thereby increasing its profits (compared to the
Nash equilibrium). Therefore, although the optimal value of τ1 is lower than τ
N
1 irrespective
16In order to avoid third order derivatives, we take µ to be constant.
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of who has the first-mover advantage, the optimal value of b¯ is lower (higher) than b¯N when
the lender (borrower) is the leader.
We conclude this section by making an overall assessment of the relative desirability
of the three scenarios. From Proposition 3 we know that when the borrower is able to
precommit to its trade policy, the equilibrium is closer to the first-best than is the Nash
equilibrium. Applying Proposition 2, we can say that both the lender and the borrower are
likely to be better off when the borrower is the leader than when both act simultaneously.17
However, when the lender has a first-mover advantage, the optimal amount of lending is even
lower than its Nash equilibrium value and therefore the borrower is likely to be worse off
in this scenario than in the Nash equilibrium, although the lender will definitely be better
off. This discussion suggests that the scenario where the borrower country has a first-mover
advantage is possibly the most desirable one from the Pareto point of view. That is, if the
borrower country can take the initiative and demonstrate a credible commitment to reducing
trade policy distortions, this could be met by a relaxation of borrowing constraints by the
lending country – to the benefit of both parties compared to the Nash equilibrium.
4 Endogenous leadership
From the analysis above an interesting question that arises is if the issue of leadership can be
determined endogenously. For this to happen, we must have a scenario that will be preferred
by both the lender and the borrower as compared to the other two scenarios. In this section,
we shall show, with the help of diagrams, that leadership by the borrower can under certain
circumstances be an endogenous outcome.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the three equilibria under different conditions. The vertical
axis represents tariffs (the instrument for the borrower) and the horizontal line the amount
17Note that Proposition 2 gives us the effect of small changes in the instruments whereas the difference
between the two equilibria can be large. Therefore, our contention is true subject to this qualification.
However, figures 1 and 2 in the following section will confirm conclusion here.
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of lending (the instrument for the lender). In both figures the lines RLRL and RBRB are
the reactions functions of the lender and borrower respectively. As has been show in the
preceding section, the former is downward – and the latter upward – slopping. The differences
between the two figures is that in Figure 2 the reaction function of the lender is flatter and
that of the borrower steeper, as compared to Figure 1. The intersection of the two reaction
functions, point N, is the Nash equilibrium.
[Figure 1 and 2 in here]
u0 and u1 are the iso-utility curves for the borrower and pi0 and pi1 are iso-profit curves
for the lender with the property that further the iso-utility (iso-profit) curves moves to the
east (south) higher is the corresponding utility (profit) level for the borrower (lender). The
points SL (SB) is the equilibrium for the case where the lender (borrower) is the leader.
Note that the iso-profit (iso-utility) curve pi1 (u1) is tangent to the reaction function of the
borrower (lender) at the point SL (SB), and attains it peak on the reaction function of
the lender (borrower). The curves u0 and pi0 intersect and attain their peaks at the Nash
equilibrium point N. The iso-utility (iso-profit) curve through the point SL (SB), which are
not drawn, would correspond to utility (profit) level of the borrower (lender) under the
leadership of the lender (borrower).
As can be seen from both figures, both the lender and the borrower are better off
under the leadership of the borrower as compared to the Nash equilibrium — as assertion
that was made on the basis of the analysis in the preceding section. It is to be noted that in
Figure 1, leadership by the borrower is in fact better for both the lender and the borrower
even compared to the scenario where the lender is the leader. In other words, the leadership
issue will be endogenously determined in Figure 1. In Figure 2 however this is not the case.
There the lender will be better off under its own leadership than under the leadership of the
borrower.
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The essential difference between the cases shown in Figures 1 and 2 lies in the relative
slopes of the borrower’s reaction functions. Note that the borrower always prefers its own
leadership to the other two forms of interaction. So whether endogenous leadership emerges
or not depends on the lender’s payoffs. In Figure 1, both reaction functions exhibit ‘real
rigidity’, i.e. in each case, a given move by whoever leads is met by a very small response
by whoever follows.18 This is captured by the fact that the lender’s reaction function is
relatively steep in τ1-b¯ space, indicating a low elasticity of b¯ to changes in τ1, while the
borrower’s is relatively flat, indicating a low elasticity of τ1 to changes in b¯.
In the case depicted in Figure 1, if the lender leads, it will cut b¯ by a lot in order to get
a small reduction in τ1 in response. If the borrower leads, by contrast, it will cut τ1 by a lot
in order to get a small increase in b¯. Thus, leadership by the borrower results in a relatively
bigger cut in τ1 with relatively smaller adjustment in b¯ by the lender, so the lender’s profits
are greater.
In the case depicted in Figure 2, both reaction functions are relatively elastic so in
each case the follower reacts strongly to a small move by the leader: a small reduction in
b¯ elicits a relatively large cut in τ1 (when the lender leads) while a small cut in τ1 elicits
a relatively large increase in b¯ (when the borrower leads), so the lender’s profits are higher
under its own leadership.
The analysis so far, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2, assumes that the sequence of
actions (as opposed to the actions themselves) is itself not subject to strategic determination.
But, following Hamilton and Slutsky [1990], suppose that at the very outset of t = 1, each
party decides on when within that period they will make their move with respect to their
respective instrument. Each party can decide whether to move immediately (at, say, stage
1 of t = 1) or with a delay (at stage 2 of t = 1). If both borrower and lender decide to move
18The concept of ‘real rigidity’ is used in the literature on menu costs to describe how one monopolistically
competitive firm adjusts prices in response to a price change by others, the more inelastic the response, the
greater the ‘real rigidity’. See Romer [1996,ch 6.12] for more details.
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at stage 1 or both decide to move at stage 2, a Nash game ensues with respect to the choice
of instruments. If one party decides to move at stage 1 and the other decides to move at
stage 2, then the corresponding Stackelberg game ensues.
The payoffs from each combination of moves is as follows (the borrower’s actions are
in boldface, the lender’s in italics):
Stage 1 Stage 2
Stage 1 uN , piN uB, piB
Stage 2 uL, piL uN , piN
where uN , uB and uL are the borrower’s payoffs under Nash, borrower leadership and lender
leadership respectively, while piN , piB and piL have similar interpretations for the lender’s
payoffs. It can now be shown that Stackelberg leadership by the borrower is the unique
Nash equilibrium of the endogenous move game. This is because uB > uN , and uN > uL,
so moving at Stage 1 is a dominant strategy for the borrower. Under iterated dominance,
the second row can be deleted from the payoff matrix; thus, since piB > piN , the lender will
choose to move at Stage 2. This result is stated as the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Borrower leadership is the unique outcome of the game in which the sequence
of moves is itself chosen strategically by each player.
5 An alternative interpretation of the lender
In this section we provide an alternative interpretation of the monopoly lender and of equa-
tion (9). We do so by introducing a foreign country whose private sector is the only source of
loans to the borrowing country and whose government determines the size of b¯ by imposing
a quota on its private sector lenders.
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The equations for the foreign country are given by:
E∗
(
1, P2,
P3
1 + r∗
,
P4
1 + r∗
, u∗
)
+ I∗ =
+R1∗(1, P2, K∗) +
R2∗(P3, P4, K∗ + I∗)
1 + r∗
+
(r − r∗)b¯
1 + r∗
(22)
(1 + r)b¯ = P3E
∗
3 + P4E
∗
4 −R2∗ (23)
R2∗3 = (1 + r
∗) (24)
The above equations are analogous to (1)-(3) for the home country. We only need to
explain the last term on the right hand side of (22). As just mentioned, we assume that the
foreign country imposes a quota on the amount of lending to the home country. This leads
to an excess demand for loans in the home country and drives a wedge between the interest
rates of the two countries.
Following the convention in the trade theory literature, we assume that the foreign
country government applies competitive loan licensing and thereby collects a quota rent
amounting to (r− r∗)b¯. The reader will immediately realize that our treatment of the credit
constraint is akin to the treatment of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in the trade theory
literature. There is an important difference, however, between the standard treatment of
VERs in the literature and the way we deal with the credit constraint here, and this arises
because of the inter-temporal nature of borrowing. In particular, one needs to make some
assumption about the time period when the quota rent is actually collected. Since the
possible rent from lending arises only in period 2 when the loan is repaid, we assume that
the government also collects the license fee from private lenders in period 2, and this quota
rent is returned to the household in a lump-sum fashion.
Differentiating (22)-(24), we obtain:
(1 + r∗)E∗5 du
∗ = (r − r∗)db¯+ b¯ dr, (25)
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where dr is as in (5). Note that the right hand side of (25) is the same as that of (9).19
6 Conclusion
For a whole host of reasons, many developing countries are unable to borrow as much as they
would like from international capital markets. While such countries might benefit from direct
interventions such as a tax on borrowing or other controls which help lower domestic demand
for foreign funds, such interventions are rarely observed in practice. For such economies, the
question arises as to whether they can ameliorate the capital market distortion through the
indirect means of trade intervention.
The first part of the paper analyzes the effects of the above policy option in a two-
period, multi-good model with endogenous investment by a borrower country which is subject
to a credit constraint from a lender country. We find that it can indeed be optimal to
intervene in trade, either through a subsidy on exports or a tariff on imports, imposed in the
first period, both of which tend to improve the ex-ante current account and thereby lower
the demand for funds from overseas.
In the second part of our analysis, we consider a number of different scenarios in
which the size of the borrowing constraint is strategically determined by a monopoly banker
of the lending country while the borrower country’s government chooses the level of the trade
intervention. To be precise, we consider three games. In the first, the borrowing country
and the lending bank act simultaneously in a Nash fashion and in the other two they act
sequentially. We find the level of the tariff is lower in both the sequential games than in the
Nash game. However, the level of lending is higher in the game in which the borrower is
the leader, and lower in the game in which the lender is the leader, than in the Nash game.
In other words, when the borrower is the leader, the equilibrium is closer to the first best.
19The second term on the right hand side of (25) gives the terms-of-trade effect. Since the foreign country
is the lender, it benefits when the interest rate rises. The first term gives the change in the quota rent for
given levels of the interest rates.
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This is not the case when the lender is the leader. Therefore, if the borrower country can
commit credibly to a lower level of trade intervention, the lender country is likely to respond
by relaxing credit controls making both countries better off.
We also find two sets of circumstances under which leadership by the borrower can be
an endogenous outcome. First of all, for some configurations of payoffs, both the borrower
and the lender will be better off under borrower leadership than under that of the lender In
such cases, both parties would unanimously agree to letting the borrower move first. Second,
if the sequence of moves is itself chosen strategically, leadership by the borrower emerges as
the unique equilibrium for any configuration of payoffs.
21
Figure 1: Unanimity in Leadership
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Figure 2: Potential Conflict for Leadership
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